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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Spencer Jay Maschek appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
In February 2008, a vehicle belonging to Maschek "was found burned in 
Devil's Corral in Jerome County." (R., p.103. 1) When contacted by the police, 
Maschek initially reported that the vehicle had been stolen. (Id.) In a 
subsequent police interview, Maschek admitted that he had "made arrangements 
with Patrick Morrisey to take the vehicle and burn it." (R., p.104.) 
The state charged Maschek with conspiracy to commit arson. (R., p.104; 
Exhibits:2 Criminal Complaint, filed 3/6/08, and Information for a Felony, filed 
5/20/08.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Maschek entered an Alford 3 plea to the 
conspiracy charge and the state agreed to recommend a unified sentence of 
eight years, with four years fixed. (R., p.105; Exhibit: Offer-Plea Agreement, filed 
8/7/08.) The state also agreed to recommend that the sentence be suspended 
1 The facts of the underlying criminal case are derived, in part, from the factual 
statement set forth by the state below in its "Statement Of Claimed Undisputed 
Material Facts" (see R., pp.103-07), which Maschek has also adopted, in part, as 
his statement of facts on appeal (see Appellant's brief, pp.3-4). 
2 At the state's request, the district court took judicial notice of 32 documents 
from the underlying criminal case. (R., pp.110-12; Tr., p.12, L.6 - p.14, L.4.) 
Those documents have been included as exhibits to the record on appeal. (See 
R., pp.136-37 (Certificate Of Exhibits).) 
3 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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and that Maschek be placed on supervised probation for four years, with the 
condition that he "meaningfully participate in and comply with the requirements of 
Mental Health Court." (Id.) In the event Maschek was not accepted into Mental 
Health Court, the state agreed "to limit itself to a period of retained jurisdiction, 
not actual penitentiary time to be served." (Id.) 
Maschek was ultimately denied admission into Mental Health Court. (R., 
p.105.) Consistent with the state's agreed-upon recommendation, the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with four years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., p.106; also State v. Maschek, Docket No.36580, 
2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 370 (Idaho App., March 3, 2010).) At the 
conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction and ordered Maschek's sentence executed. (Id.) The court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction was affirmed on appeal. (Id.) 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Maschek filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and 
supporting affidavit, alleging numerous claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. (R., pp.4-32.) At Maschek's request, the court appointed counsel to 
represent Maschek in the post-conviction proceedings. (R., pp.33-46.) 
Appointed counsel thereafter filed an amended petition, restating the claims in 
the original petition but presenting no new factual allegations or supporting 
evidence. (R., pp.77-79.) As "concisely [re]stated," the amended petition 
alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for, inter alia: 
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(iii) Failure to move to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea, pursuant 
to I.C.R. 11, after petitioner was denied admittance into 
Mental Health Court[;] 
(iv) Failure to adequately explain the entirety of the plea 
agreement and what would happen if petitioner was denied 
entrance into Mental Health Court[; and] 
(v) Failure to move to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea, pursuant 
to !.C.R. 11, after the court relinquished jurisdiction at the 
rider review hearing. 
(R., pgp.77-78.) 
The state answered the amended petition and moved to summarily 
dismiss it, arguing that the claims therein were conclusory, disproven by the 
record and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.80-109.) After 
a hearing, the district court granted the state's motion and dismissed the 
amended petition in its entirety. (R., pp.116-18.) The court entered its final 
judgment of dismissal on December 14, 2010. (R., pp.119-20.) Maschek timely 
appealed. (R., pp.121-24.) 
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ISSUE 
Maschek states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied post 
conviction relief without considering the record which established 
Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, or, in the 
alternative, Petitioner is entitled to post conviction relief since his 
attorney failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea when he did not 
receive probation despite the court's express advice that he could. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
Has Maschek failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims? 
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ARGUMENT 
Maschek Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
A Introduction 
The district court dismissed Maschek's amended post-conviction in its 
entirety, ruling that the claims in the petition were either conclusory or disproved 
by the record, or both. (R., pp.116-18; Tr., p.17, L.18 - p.23, L.1.) On appeal, 
Maschek challenges the dismissal of only the three ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims "concerning the plea agreement" and/or his guilty plea. 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) With respect to those three claims, Maschek argues that 
he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing or, alternatively, post-conviction relief 
because, he contends: (1) the district court relied solely on misrepresentations 
of the prosecutor and did not consider evidence that he contends supports his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and (2) the underlying criminal record 
establishes his ineffective assistance of counsel claims as a matter of law or, at 
the very least, raises a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing on each of his claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-26.) 
Maschek's arguments fail. He has failed to show error in either the scope 
of the district court's review of the relevant evidence or its application of the law 
to the facts in concluding that Maschek failed to carry his burden of presenting a 
genuine issue of material fact to overcome the summary dismissal of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner1s favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Nellsch v. 
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. Maschek Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Based On His 
Claims That The Prosecutor Misrepresented The Record And That The 
District Court, Relying On The Alleged Misrepresentations, Failed To 
Consider Evidence Relevant To His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Claims 
Maschek argues that the prosecutor in the post-conviction case 
misrepresented the record by citing only to portions of the change of plea 
hearing that were favorable to the state's position, and that the district court, 
"believing that the state was accurately portraying the record, simply relied on it" 
in dismissing Maschek's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.22-25; see p.15 ("Presumably, the post conviction court did not 
read the entire transcript of the change of plea hearing, but just relied on the 
state's misleading version of it appearing in its brief.").) - Maschek's arguments 
are without merit. While the state below did cite to only a portion of the change 
of plea hearing in its brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal (R., 
pp.94-96), the state also specifically requested that the district court take judicial 
notice of the entire transcript of the change of plea hearing on which the state's 
arguments were based (R., pp.110-12). The district court did so (Tr., p.12, L.6-
p.14, L.4) and quoted directly from that transcript, not from the state's brief, in 
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dismissing Maschek's petition (Tr., p.1 12 p .19, L. 15). Maschek's claims 
on appeal that the district court "simply relied on" the state's representations of 
the record and "did not read the entire transcript of the change of plea hearing" 
are wholly unfounded. 
Even if the district court had relied solely on the state's representations of 
the record in dismissing Maschek's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 
Maschek has failed to show that such reliance would, by itself, constitute any 
basis for reversal. "On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief 
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a 
genuine issue of material fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions together with any affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (dting Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 
80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). Because this Court conducts an independent 
review of the record to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate, 
Maschek's attacks on the integrity of both the prosecutor and the district court 
are not only factua!ly unsupported, they are also legally irrelevant 
D. Maschek Has Falied To Show Error In The District Court's Determination 
That Maschek Failed To Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact 
Entitling Him To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Of His Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima fade case as to each element of the 
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claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's 
claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing 
I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court 
must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required 
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 
112 (2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to 
relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to 
dismissing the petition. ~ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for 
the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the 
original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." ~ 
As relevant to this appeal, Maschek's amended petition alleged that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not adequately explaining the plea agreement to him 
and for not filing a motion to withdraw Maschek's plea, either after he was denied 
admission to Mental Health Court or after the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction and ordered his sentence executed. (R., p.78; see also pp.11-12, 20-
23 (statements in Maschek's affidavit pertaining to ineffective assistance of 
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counsel claims at issue).) overcome summary dismissal of these claims, 
Maschek was required that "(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed] 
as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of 
fact exist[ed] as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [Maschek's] case." Baidwin 
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 1 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a 
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice). To establish deficient performance, the 
burden was on Maschek "to show that his attorney's conduct fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. This objective standard embraces a 
strong presumption that trial counsel was competent and diligent." !ft 
"[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless 
those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Id. To establish 
prejudice, Maschek was required to show "a reasonable probability that but for 
his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different." kl 
Application of the foregoing legal standards to the facts of this case 
supports the district court's order of summary dismissal; Maschek failed to 
demonstrate from his pleadings and evidence that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
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1. Maschek Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Explain The Plea Agreement 
Maschek entered his guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. (Exhibit: 
Offer-Plea Agreement, filed 8/7/08.) The written agreement, signed by Maschek 
on August 7, 2008, required Maschek to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit first 
degree arson. (Id.) In exchange, the state agreed to recommend a prison term 
of "4 years determinate plus 4 years indeterminate, for a total of 8 years." (Id.) 
The state also agreed to recommend that the sentence be suspended and that 
Maschek be placed on supervised probation for four years, with the condition 
that he "meaningfully participate in and comply with the requirements of Mental 
Health Court (MHC)." (Id.) Finally, as is relevant to this appeal, the state agreed 
that if Maschek was "not accepted into MHC, the state [would] limit itself to a 
period of retained jurisdiction, not actual penitentiary time to be served." (Id.) 
Ultimately, Maschek was denied admission to Mental Health Court. (R., 
p.105.) Consistent with the terms of the state's agreed-upon recommendation, 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with four years fixed, 
and retained jurisdiction. (R., p.106.) At the conclusion of the retained 
jurisdiction period, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered 
Maschek's sentence executed. (Id.) 
In his amended post-conviction petition, Maschek alleged that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to "adequately explain the entirety of the plea 
agreement and what would happen if petitioner was denied entrance into Mental 
Health Court." (R., p.78.) The district court summarily dismissed this allegation, 
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ruling that it was both without factual support and disproved by the record. (Tr., 
p.19, L.16-p.20, L.12.) The court explained: 
The offer/plea agreement sets forth that Mascheck [sic] had read 
the offer, that he understood it, and that he accepted the offer on 
its stated terms. 
As I've already noted, a term of the plea offer was that if 
Mascheck [sic] was not accepted into Mental Health Court, the 
state would limit itself to a period of retained jurisdiction. 
Also, the change of plea advisory form sets forth that 
Maschek had discussed all the ramifications of his case with his 
lawyer and had discussed fully with his lawyer the nature of the 
charge and Maschek's constitutional rights and defenses to the 
charge, including the possible consequences. As such, this 
allegation is disproved by the record and is dismissed. 
(Tr., p.19, L.22 - p.20, L.12.) Contrary to Maschek's assertions on appeal, a 
review of the record supports the district court's determination that Maschek 
failed to demonstrate a genuine issue material fact entitling him to an evidentiary 
hearing on this claim. 
The only "evidence" Maschek offered to support his claim that counsel 
failed to adequately explain the plea agreement consisted of his own self-serving 
statements that defense counsel promised him that "he would be placed in the 
'Mental Health Court' program or be placed on probation, with a condition of 
continuing counseling" (R., p.19, ,-r 40); "[w]hile discussing the plea agreement 
and the entry of an "Alford Plea" with Defense Counsel prior to the entry of the 
plea, [he] was instructed to answer the Judge's question as 'just a formality"' and 
"to give answers as though [he] was entering a willing guilty plea" (R., p.21, ,1~ 47 
and 48); and defense counsel promised him that he "would be receiving 
probation so long as [he] did as instructed" (R., p.21, ,I 49). As found by the 
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district court, however, the record of the underlying criminal proceedings clearly 
disproves Maschek's claims. The plea agreement itself very clearly set forth the 
state's obligations with respect to its sentencing recommendation and specifically 
provided that, if Maschek was "not accepted into MHC, the state will limit itself to 
a period of retained jurisdiction, not actual penitentiary time to be served." 
(Exhibit: Offer-Plea Agreement, filed 8/7/08.) Maschek signed the agreement 
and, in so doing, attested: "/ have read the offer, I understand it, and I accept 
the offer on the above-stated terms." (Id. (bold and italics original, underline 
added).) He also filled out and signed a guilty plea advisory form in which he 
affirmatively indicated that he was satisfied with his attorney's services and that 
his attorney had fully discussed with him the possible consequences of his guilty 
plea. (Exhibit: Change Of Plea Form - Alford Plea, filed 817/08, p.2.) 
Significantly, Maschek also acknowledged understanding that, as a result of 
pleading guilty, he could be "imprisoned in the State Penitentiary" and his 
"sentence may be imposed with no right to probation." (Id., p.3 (emphasis 
added).) 
In addition to being contrary to his own statements in the plea advisory 
form that he was satisfied with counsel's performance, had fully discussed with 
counsel the possible consequences of his guilty plea and understood that a 
prison sentence could be imposed with no right to probation, Maschek's claim 
that counsel failed "to adequately explain the entirety of the plea agreement and 
what would happen if [he] was denied entrance into Mental Heath Court" also 
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stands in contrast with the statements he made at the change of plea hearing. 
At the hearing, the district court conducted the following coHoquy: 
COURT:] Mr. Maschek, I want to first talk to you 
about this plea agreement. I know you have read it. I know you 
have signed it, but it's important that I make sure that you 
understand what you're committing to, or that you understand what 
the state's commitment is, I should say. 
That commitment is this: That if you plead guilty to this 
charge this morning, the state will be recommending to the court a 
unified sentence of eight years, consisting of four years fixed, four 
years indeterminate. What that means is that should that sentence 
ever be imposed, you would have to serve a minimum of four years 
in the Idaho State Penitentiary before your would be eligible for 
parole. After that, during the second four year portion, parole 
would be up to the parole board. 
Do you understand that that's the consequence or the 
meaning of that sentence? 
[Maschek]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The state is going to recommend that 
that sentence be suspended and that you will, as a condition of 
probation, participate in the mental health court program here in 
Twin Falls. I'm assuming that Mr. Williams [defense counsel] has 
explained in some detail what that means? 
[Maschek]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: That program is an intensive program. 
It is probably at least a one year program. It may be longer. It 
requires a great commitment on your part for weekly meetings and 
numerous other things. Is that kind of generally your 
understanding of that program? 
[Maschek]: Yes, sir, it is my understanding is it's kind of 
like very intense probation. 
THE COURT: That's probably a good explanation of 
that. 
Do you understand that there are some hoops that you have 
to go through before you can be considered for mental health 
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court? In other words, you have to be evaluated by the mental 
health court staff, you have to meet the diagnosis qualifications, 
that I don't have anything to do with that. In other words, I certainly 
will follow these - I've told your counsel I will follow these 
recommendations and ask that you be put in mental health 
court, but I cannot control that. If for some reason you don't 
qualify, then what happens is you come back before me for 
sentencing and we look at some alternatives. Do you 
understand that? 
[Maschek]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: So there is a little bit of a gamble if 
you will, to you. Do you understand that? 
[Maschek]: Yes. 
THE COURT: And if you're not allowed to get into 
mental health court, your plea in this case will still stand; in 
other words, you can't withdraw it. Do you understand that? 
[Maschek]: Yes, sir. 
(Exhibit: 8/7/08 Tr., p.3, L.13 - p.5, L.18 (emphasis added).) Later in the plea 
colloquy the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: ... [l]f it became necessary to actually 
sentence you in this case because you were not accepted into 
mental health court - well, let me rephrase it this way. Do you 
understand that's the maximum penalty that could be imposed in 
this case [a 25-year prison sentence and a $100,000 fine]? 
[Maschek]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Again, I have told your attorneys, 
pursuant to a chambers conference that we had yesterday, that 
since this matter is presented to me as a Rule 11 plea agreement 
that I will honor the recommendations of the state to place you on 
probation. Do you understand that if for some reason something 
would come up and I would change my mind about that, that I 
would allow you to withdraw your plea of guilty? Do you 
understand that? 
[Maschek]: Yes, sir. 
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THE COURT: 
of Mr. Williams? 
Are you satisfied with the representation 
[MaschekJ: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Is there anything that he has not done 
that you believe that he should do? 
[Maschek]: No, sir. 
(Exhibit: 8/7/08 Tr., p.8, .20 - p.9, 16.) 
The record of the change of plea hearing, in conjunction with the plea 
agreement itself and Maschek's statements on the plea advisory form, 
demonstrate that Maschek understood the terms of the plea agreement, 
including the "what would happen if [heJ was denied entrance into Mental Health 
Court." (R, p.78.) The district court went over the terms of the agreement and 
confirmed that Maschek understood that the state would be recommending 
probation and Mental Health Court but, if Maschek did not qualify for Mental 
Health Court, the court would "look at some alternatives." (Exhibit: 7/8/08 Tr., 
p.3, L.19 p.5, L.13.) The court advised Maschek that, under the terms of the 
plea agreement, he could face up to eight years in prison, a fact which Maschek 
said he understood. (Id., p.3, L.19 - p.4, L.6.) Maschek also acknowledged 
understanding that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea if he was not 
accepted into Mental Health Court. (Id., p.5, Ls.14-18.) Toward the end of the 
plea colloquy the court told Maschek that it "would honor the recommendations 
of the state to place [him] on probation" but, if the court changed its mind about 
that, it would allow Maschek to withdraw his plea. (Id., p.9, Ls.1-9 (emphasis 
added).) As dictated by the clear terms of the plea agreement, previously 
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explained by the court and acknowledged by Maschek earlier in the change of 
plea hearing, however, the state's obligation to recommend probation was 
contingent upon Maschek's acceptance into Mental Health Court. (Id., p.4, L.7 -
p.5, L.18.) Otherwise, the record demonstrates, Maschek understood that he 
could face imposition of a prison sentence, "with no right to probation." (Id., 
p.3, L.19 - p.5, L.18; Exhibit: Change of Plea Form - Alford Plea, filed 8/7 /08, 
p.3.) 
The allegations in Maschek's amended petition and affidavit relating to his 
understanding of the plea agreement, particularly the allegation that he was 
promised probation, were clearly contradicted by his own signed statements in 
both the written plea agreement and the plea advisory form and were also 
contrary to his statements at the change of plea hearing. Because the 
allegations were disproved by the record, they did not create a genuine issue of 
material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802 (post-conviction allegations insufficient for granting of relief 
when they are clearly disproved by the record); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 
368, 924 P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996) (same). Maschek has failed to show 
error in the summary dismissal of this claim. 
2. Maschek Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him To 
An Evidentiary Hearing On Either Of His Claims That Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Failing To Move To Withdraw His Plea 
Maschek alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
withdraw his guilty plea at two separate stages of the proceedings - "after 
[Maschek] was denied admittance into Mental Health Court," and "after the court 
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relinquished jurisdiction the rider review hearing." (R., p.78.) The district court 
dismissed both of claims, ruling that Maschek failed to make even a prima 
facie showing that such motions, if made, would have been granted. (Tr., p.18, 
L.12 - p.19, L.15, 13 - p21, L.7.) Maschek has failed to show error 
the district court's rulings. 
When a defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion, "the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion in 
question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent 
performance." Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, _, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 
2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. 
App.1996)). "Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial 
court, is generally 
266 P.3d at 1172-73. 
inative of both prongs of the Strickland test." at 
Motions to withdraw a guilty plea are governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which 
provides: 
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition 
of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the 
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and 
permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea. 
Pursuant to this rule, a motion to withdraw made before sentencing may be 
liberally granted, but must be granted only if the defendant proves either that the 
plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made or that there is another 
just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 
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535-36, 211 P.3d 775, 780-81 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 
Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). A motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea after sentencing should be granted only to "correct manifest injustice." 
I .C.R. 33(c). Application of these standards to Maschek's claims that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw his plea both pre- and post-
sentencing supports the district court's determination, based upon evidence 
before it, that such motions would have been denied. 
Maschek alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
withdraw his plea after he was denied admission to Mental Health Court, but he 
did not allege any facts that, if true, would have entitled him to withdraw his plea 
at that state of the proceedings. He did not allege that his plea was involuntary 
in the sense that he did not understand he could be denied admission to Mental 
Health Court and, in fact, the record of the underlying criminal proceedings 
shows the opposite. When asked by the district court whether he understood 
that there was no guarantee he would qualify for Mental Health Court, Maschek 
replied, "Yes, sir." (Exhibit: 7/8/08 Tr., p.4, L.23 - p.5, L.13) He was also 
explicitly advised, and affirmatively acknowledged understanding, that being 
rejected for admission to Mental Health Court would not afford him any basis to 
withdraw his plea. (Id., p.5, Ls.14-18.) Having failed to allege any facts to 
demonstrate that his plea was involuntary or that there existed any other just 
reason to withdraw his plea after he was denied admission to Mental Health 
Court, Maschek failed to make even a prima facie showing that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw Maschek's plea. 
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On appeal, Maschek argues "is entitled to relief as a 
on his that counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to withdraw 
guilty plea after he was denied admission to Mental Health Court 
criminal court told him he could withdraw his guilty plea if he was not placed on 
probation." (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Maschek's argument is nonsensical 
and misconstrues the pleadings. The amended petition alleged only that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw Maschek's plea "after [he] 
to move to withdraw the plea when the court sentenced Maschek to a period of 
retained jurisdiction. Because the claim in the petition was limited to an 
allegation that the denial of admission to Mental Health Court was itself a basis 
for withdrawal of the plea, whatever promises the court may have made about 
the ultimate sentence to be imposed are irrelevant and do not entitle Maschek to 
relief. 4 
Alternatively, Maschek argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on the claim because the criminal court, by failing to advise Maschek 
that he could be sent on a rider but not be placed on probation afterward, failed 
to adequately explain the consequences of his guilty plea in violation of I.C.R. 
11. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-22.) Again, this argument is irrelevant to the claim 
actually made in the petition -- that the failure to be admitted into Mental Health 
Court was itself a basis for withdrawal of the plea. Moreover, a review of 
4 As set forth in more detail below, the state does not concede that the court 
promised to place Maschek on probation regardless of whether he was admitted 
to Mental Health Court. 
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Maschek's pleadings shows that Maschek never alleged a failure of the district 
court to comply with I.C.R. 11 as a basis for withdrawal of his plea. (See 
generally R., pp.4-32, 77-79.) It is well settled that "'[t)he trial court is not 
required to search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine 
issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required to 
bring that evidence to the court's attention."' Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 
224 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics 
Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008)). Because 
Maschek never alleged a violation of !.C.R. 11 as a basis for withdrawing his 
plea, and because such an allegation is ultimately irrelevant to Maschek's claim 
that counsel should have moved to withdraw his plea based solely on the fact 
that he was denied admission to Mental Health Court, Maschek has failed to 
show any basis for reversal. 
Maschek has also failed to show any basis for reversal of the district 
court's order summarily dismissing his claim that counsel was ineffective for not 
moving to withdraw his plea "after the court relinquished jurisdiction at the rider 
review hearing." (R., p.78, ,T(v).) Maschek would only have been entitled to 
withdraw his plea after sentencing upon a showing that the withdrawal was 
necessary "to correct manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c). As found by the district 
court, however, "[tJhe record is absolutely devoid of any fact establishing any 
manifest injustice in this case which would have been sufficient to support 
Maschek's withdrawal of a guilty plea well after judgment was pronounced and 
20 
sentence imposed." 
appeal, a review of the record 
1, 3-7.) Contrary to Maschek's assertions on 
the district court's determination. 
The only evidence Maschek presented to support his claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw his guilty plea after the court 
relinquished jurisdiction was the following statement made by the court at the 
change of plea hearing: 
Again, I have told your attorneys, pursuant to a chambers 
conference that we had yesterday, that since this matter is 
presented to me as a Rule 11 plea agreement that I will honor the 
recommendations of the state to place you on probation. Do you 
understand that if for some reason something would come up and I 
would change my mind about that, that I would allow you to 
withdraw your plea of guilty? 
(Exhibit: 7/8/08 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-8; R., p.22, ,m 51 and 53 (quoting court's 
statement at change of plea hearing).) Maschek acknowledges on appeal that 
the district court also advised Maschek that he could not withdraw his plea if he 
was denied admission to Mental Health Court. (Appellant's brief, p.21.) He 
argues, however, that "the two apparently contrary statements of the criminal 
court can actuaHy be reconciled" in his favor. (Id.) Specifically, he contends: 
While the first statement of the criminal court advised that if 
he was not admitted into Mental Health Court he could not 
withdraw his guilty plea, the second statement advised that if the 
court was not going to place him on probation, it would allow him to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, Mr. Maschek could withdraw his 
plea after his rider when jurisdiction was relinquished, because it 
was at that point that something had come up which made the 
court change its mind about placing him on probation. 
(Id., pp.21-22.) Maschek's interpretation of the court's statements, while 
creative, is belied by a plain reading of the record. 
Contrary to Maschek's claim on appeal, the district court did not advise 
him that "if the court was not going to place him on probation, it would allow him 
to withdraw his guilty plea." (Appellant's brief, p.22.) Rather, the court stated 
that it would "honor the recommendations of the state to place [him] on 
probation" but, if the court changed its mind about that, it would allow Maschek 
to withdraw his plea. (Exhibit: 7/8/08 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-9 (emphasis added).) When 
the court made this statement, it had already explained to Maschek that the 
state's obligation to recommend probation was specifically contingent upon 
Maschek being accepted into Mental Health Court. (Id., p.4, L.7 - p.5, L.6.) It 
had also explained to Maschek that, if he was not accepted into Mental Health 
Court, the court would look at other sentencing alternatives, and Maschek would 
not be permitted to withdraw his plea. (Id., p.5, Ls.6-18.) Thus, while the state 
agrees with Maschek that the court's statements did not conflict, the state 
disagrees that there is any logical way in which the statements can be reconciled 
in Maschek's favor. Viewed in context, the court's statement to Maschek that it 
would permit him to withdraw his plea if it did not honor the state's 
recommendation for probation was merely a promise to place Maschek on 
probation if he was accepted into Mental Health Court; it did not confer upon 
Maschek a right, or even a reasonable expectation, that he would be permitted to 
withdraw his plea if, upon being denied admission to Mental Health Court, he 
was not placed on probation. 
Maschek failed to allege any facts or present any evidence to 
demonstrate entitlement to either the pre-sentencing or post-sentencing 
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withdrawal his plea. Having failed to do so, he has to show any error in 
the 
to 
dismissal of his claims that counsel was ineffective for not moving 
raw his plea. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Maschek's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 23rd day of April 2012. 
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